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and inoffensive man could be unduly restrained without any
remedy. The granting of a request for a hearing concerning
restraint leads to an adversary procedure where essential facts
can be determined and preserved in the record for appeal. The
law is well established that a defendant charged with crime should
not be denied those procedural remedies that are of the essence
of an opportunity to defend. 16 Plagiarizing the tongue-in-cheek
phraseology of Judge Nix in the French case, we may conclude
that defendants tied to logs, enclosed in steel cages, or otherwise
restrained unjustly, will cease to be a problem if such a hearing
procedure is adopted.
Royse M. Parr

DoMEsTC RELATIONS: HETEROLOGOUS ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION

In Gursky v. Gursky, -Misc.2d-, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963) the
husband sued for annulment of marriage and separation from his
wife who had, with the plaintiff's consent submitted herself to the
technique of heterologous artificial insemination, and as a result
of said technique, had given birth to a daughter. The wife counterclaimed for separation.
It was stipulated by the parties that there had been a failure
of consummation of the marriage and as a result of this failure both
agreed in writing that the wife would be artificially inseminated
with the semen of a third party donor.' Included in this written
agreement was a promise by the husband to pay all expenses resulting from the insemination. The court in deciding the wife's
counterclaim held that the husband, as the result of an implied
promise, was liable for support of the child but ruled, nevertheless, that the child was illegitimate in the eyes of the law.
"Unless there can be read into the statutory enactments of this
state, dealing with persons born out of wedlock, an intention
to modify the settled concept as to the status of a child whose
father was not married to its mother, it must be presumed that
the historical concept of illegitimacy with respect to such a
child remains in force and effect."2
This decision was based on the settled common law concept
16 Snyder v. Commonwealth, 291 U.S. 97, 122, 54 Sup.Ct. 330, 338, 78
L.Ed. 674, 686 (1933).
' Artificial insemination which utilizes a third party donor is known as
heterologous artificial insemination (A.I.D.) as distinguished from homologous artificial insemination where the husband is the donor of the semen
(A.I.H.), Johnston, Family Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REy.368 (1956).
2242 N.Y.S.2d at 409 [Emphasis added.].
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of illegitimacy, as adopted by the statutes of New York.4 More
specifically, the court said that these laws are applicable in instances
involving children begotten by heterologous artificial insemination.5
But the common law concept of illegitimacy as adopted by statute
did not, indeed could not have, envisioned the biological technique
of artificial insemination and it was therefore with futility that the
court looked to those statutes for guidance in the Gursky case. The
failure of a legislature to act in a new area does not necessarily
mean that the legislative intent is to apply existing statutes to an
entirely different concept of the law. Is it any wonder that state
legislatures hestitate to act in an area as tenuous as this? Heterologous artificial insemination is tightly enterwoven with problems of
legitimacy, negligence, malpractice and inheritance, to name but
a few. That legislation dealing with this problem is slow in coming
is understandable but the lack of it should not give license to the
courts to apply statutes in an area where they have no reasonable
or logical application.
When the Gursky case is considered in light of the statute applied and the lack of case law to use as precedent, it appears to be
a well reasoned case. But however well reasoned it may be, the
result is still obnoxious to ones sense of justice.
In Strnad v. Strnad,6 the court, while aiming at the correct end
result attempted to formulate a new theory of law by which a child,
born to a wife as the result of heterologous artificial insemination
and performed with the consent of the husband, could be made
legitimate in the eyes of the law. The court used the words "partial"
and "semi-adoption" in an attempt to establish a constructive parentage on the part of the husband. The court in the Gursky case rejected this theory and pointed out that7 legal adoption is statutory
and cannot be conferred by the court.
In both the Gursky case and the Strnad case the court was confronted with heterologous artificial insemination performed on the
wife with the husband's consent. In the latter case, the court recognized the importance of the husband's consent and stated:
..
. Alssuming again that plaintiff was artificially inseminated
with the consent of the defendant, this child is not an illegitimate
child." 8
The court in the Gurslky case recognized that the document of
"consent" signed by the husband and entered into evidence, constituted more than a mere acquiescence or approval by him to the
s One begotten and bom out of lawful wedlock is termed a bastard.
Ibid. Ex parte Newsome, 212 Ala. 168, 102 So. 216 (1924); Curry v. Maynard, 227 Ind. 46, 83 N.E.2d 782 (1949); State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17
N.W.2d 546 (1945); Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1403 (1945).
4 N.Y. F my CounT Acr Azux. § 512 (Thompsonn 1962).
5242 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
6190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948).
7242 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
8 190 Misc. at 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 392. [Emphasis added.3
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procedure. It was rather a request by the husband made to the
physician to perform the artificial insemination upon his wife. This
"consent" is the tool by which a child so conceived may be deemed
legitimate.
The law presumes the legitimacy of a child born during a state
of lawful matrimony.9 But this is a presumption which may be
rebutted should the husband present evidence to prove that the
child, even though born during the course of his marriage to the
child's mother, was conceived by her in an adulterous relationship. 10
In the Gursky case, the child was born during the lawful marriage of the parties; the presumption of legitimacy therefore attaches. But the child's father was not the mother's husband. The
question now becomes; is the act of conceiving through heterologous artificial insemination an act of adultery? Arguably not, because
conception was not coupled with an act of voluntary sexual intercourse which is a necessary element in establishing adultery."1
Conception was accomplished by a scientific technique consented
to by each spouse in order to gain a child for the mutual benefit
and pleasure of both. Where consent, approval and request are
evidenced by conduct and contract, the parties should both be
estopped from denying the legitimacy of the child.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied where one
party assumes a position which, if not maintained, will result in
an injustice to another.12 Certainly, the husband in the Gursky
case assumed the position of prospective father and subsequently
the position of father. If he is allowed to change this position, an
injustice accrues to both the wife and the child.
An estoppel arises when one by acts, representations, admissions or silence intentionally induces another to change his positi6n
for the worse.'8 The husband requested in writing that the procedure be performed. He promised to pay all expenses arising out
of the act; and no evidence was entered to show that his wife would
have submitted to the procedure without her husband's consent.
Not only did he induce his wife to act to her detriment but by
living with her after the procedure was accomplished he ratified
itl Now he wishes to deny the legitimacy of the child. If, as in the
Gursky case, the plea of illegitimacy is allowed the court sanctions
the infliction of an outrage upon the wife and her child. Estoppel,
9 Duke v. Duke, 185 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. 1962); State ex rel Satterfield
v. Sullivan, 115 Ohio App. 347, 185 N.E.2d 47 (1962).
10 State ex rel Satterfield v. Sullivan, supra note 9.
"1Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. .55.5, 30 A.2d 704 (1943);
Ermis v. Ermis, 255 Wis. 339, 38 N.W.2d 485 (1949).
1.2Dodd v. Rotterman, 330 Ill. 362, 161 N.E. 756 (1928); Young v.
Venters, 229 Ky. 806, 18 S.W.2d 277 (1929); Seire v. Police & Fire Pension
Comm'n,
4 N.J. Super. 230, 66 A.2d 746 (1949).
13 Posner v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 33 Mise.2d 653, 226
N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sup.Ct. 1962); Neverett v. Towne, 121 Vt. 447, 159 A.2d

345 (1960).
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in its broadest sense, is penalty paid by one for affirmative acts
which inflict injury upon another, and its application here would
seem appropriate.
Under the circumstances of this case and others which will
follow involving heterologous artificial insemination with consent
of the husband, it would seem logical and just to place the responsibility of parenthood upon the husband's shoulders as though he
were the natural father, for this is the intent of the parties when
agreement and consent is given. Such is the responsibility imposed
upon the foster parents of adopted children.
A plea of estoppel neither admits nor denies the facts alleged
by the plaintiff, who in the Gursky case was the husband, but
denies his right to allege them,14 thus allowing the presumption of
legitimacy to stand.
In a volatile environment such as ours, man finds himself
confronted daily with frustrations ignited by the constant flux
of his surroundings. Because most of us tend to seek stability and
security, we build within ourselves a wall of resistance to these
changes. The net result of this repulsion to change has been described as cautious, conservative and backward. In the area of
science, this trait results in what is referred to as the 'sociological
lag.' This 'lag' appears in all phases of human endeavor and manifests itself in an unwillingness to keep pace with technological
progress. John Adams acknowledged this trait when he said: "All
changes are irksome to the human mind, especially those which are
attended with great dangers and uncertain effects."
Such resistance to change has a beneficial effect on our society
by adding an element of stability to what would otherwise be a
tortuous day by day fight to adapt. In the field of law, resistance
to change appears in the principle of stare decisis. This system of
jurisprudence derives part of its strength from a resistance to change
coupled with the ability to do so as the need arises. But the court
in the Gursky case adhered to the common law with such tenacity
that a sound decision based on the best interest of the child was
impossible. Occasionally, as in the Gursky and Strnad cases, the
courts find themselves confronted with a set of facts for which
there is no established body of law. In such instances the duty of
the court is to render a just and beneficial remedy which may be
used as precedent in future litigation involving the same subject
matter.
H. K. Myers, Jr.
14 Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Arrington, 216 Ala.

21, 112

So. 428 (1927).
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